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Stephen Crain  &  Drew Khlentzos 
 
 
Arguments are presented supporting logical nativism: the conjecture that 
humans have an innate logic faculty. In making a case for logical nativism, 
this article concentrates on children’s acquisition of the logical concept of 
disjunction. Despite the widespread belief to the contrary, the interpretation 
of disjunction in human languages is arguably the same as it is in classical 
logic, namely inclusive–or. The argument proceeds with empirical support 
for the view that the inclusive–or is the meaning of disjunction in human 
languages, from studies of child language development and from cross-
linguistic research. Evidence is presented showing that young children 
adhere to universal semantic principles that characterize adult linguistic 
competence across languages. Several a priori arguments are also offered in 
favour of logical nativism. These arguments show that logic, like Socratic 
virtue and like certain aspects of language, is not learned and cannot be 
taught — thus supporting a strong form of innateness. 
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universals 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is a contingent truth, in our view, that human language disjunction corres-
ponds to inclusive–or, as in classical logic. In making our prima facie case for 
logical nativism, we will take advantage of this specific contingent fact about 
human languages, in the following ways. One way is to provide empirical 
evidence from studies of child language demonstrating that young children 
initially adopt the inclusive–or interpretation of disjunction despite the paucity of 
evidence for this interpretation in the primary linguistic data. Some of the 
relevant data demonstrating that children’s interpretation is consistent with 
classical logic have been gathered in recent studies of two-year-old English-
speaking children, and from studies of both English-speaking and Japanese-
                                                
      This research was supported in part by Australian Research Council Grant FF0456432 to 
Stephen Crain, and ARC Grant DP0879842 to Stephen Crain and Rosalind Thornton. We 
thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful input, and we thank the following friends and 
colleagues for assistance and insights: Ivano Caponigro, Gennaro Chierchia, Takuya Goro, 
Andrea Gualmini, Martin Hackl, Britta Jensen, Thomas Lee, Luisa Meroni, Utako Minai, 
Anna Notley, Tanya Reinhart, Francesco Ursini, Peng Zhou, and, especially, Rosalind 
Thornton. 
Is Logic Innate? 
 
25 
speaking 4–5-year-old children. The finding is that children demonstrate know-
ledge of the semantic principles that characterize adult linguistic competence, 
across these and other languages. It turns out that Japanese-speaking children 
differ from adult speakers, by adopting the inclusive–or interpretation of 
disjunction even in simple negative sentences where, for adults, disjunction is 
governed by an implicature of exclusivity because of its scopal relationship with 
negation. Japanese-speaking children apparently ignore the input from adults, 
and maintain an inclusive–or interpretation in simple negative sentences. The 
studies from child language form one empirical argument for logical nativism.  
 Another empirical argument for logical nativism is based on cross-
linguistic research. We show that in typologically different languages (Japanese, 
Chinese and English), the interpretation of disjunction is consistent with classical 
logic, again because disjunction is interpreted as inclusive–or. Three putatively 
universal linguistic principles are proposed, all utilizing inclusive–or. It is noted, 
however, that these principles are manifested in complex structures in which 
disjunction combines (i) with negation, (ii) with the universal quantifier (e.g., 
English every), and (iii) with focus expressions (e.g., English only). In view of the 
complexity of these phenomena, it is unlikely that young children have relevant 
evidence in their primary linguistic experience to inform them that expressions 
for disjunction in human languages conform to classical logic. This brings the 
empirical findings from studies of children’s interpretation of disjunction in line 
with logical nativism. We contrast logical nativism with a learning-theoretical 
account of children’s acquisition of the interpretation of disjunction. The learning 
account maintains that children’s acquisition of the interpretation of disjunction 
is based on witnessing speakers’ use of disjunction in conformity with certain 
inference rules (introduction and elimination rules). We argue that the learning 
account is highly implausible because the hypothesized input turns out to be an 
unlikely source of children’s interpretation of disjunction. To bolster our empi-
rical conclusions, we end the article by presenting two a priori arguments for 
logical nativism. One is, surprisingly, based on work by Quine. The other is, not 
surprisingly, based on work by Fodor.  
 
 
2. Circumventing Subset Problems 
 
To avoid prejudice, let us admit the possibility that disjunction, e.g., English or, 
may have the meaning associated with exclusive–or in human languages. We will 
indicate this meaning using the symbol ⊕. If a statement of the form ‘A or B’ is 
true on this interpretation (meaning A ⊕ B), then exactly one, either A or B, is 
true. By contrast, we indicate the inclusive–or interpretation of disjunction using 
the standard wedge symbol ∨. In human languages in which disjunction means 
inclusive–or, a statement of the form ‘A or B’ (meaning A ∨ B), is true if either A 
or B is true, or if both A and B are true.  
 Let us consider the learnability of disjunction in human languages. 
Suppose there is a class of adult languages L1 with exclusive–or (⊕-disjunction) as 
the unique interpretation of disjunction, and suppose there is another class of 
languages L2 in which disjunction is uniquely inclusive–or (∨-disjunction). Due to 
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the truth conditions associated with ⊕-disjunction and ∨-disjunction, any 
disjunctive statement that is true in L1 will also be true in languages in L2 (with ∨-
disjunction). The converse relation does not hold, however, because A ⊕ B entails 
A ∨ B, but not vice versa. In other words, statements with ⊕-disjunction are true 
in a subset of the circumstances corresponding to statements with ∨-disjunction 
— with respect to disjunction, L1 ⊆ L2.  
 Consider how learners decide whether the language they are exposed to is 
in L1 or in L2. Suppose the learner guesses, without compelling evidence one way 
or the other, that the language spoken by members of the linguistic community is 
in L1 (with ⊕-disjunction), but in fact the local language is in L2 (with ∨-
disjunction). Since L1 ⊆ L2 there will be positive evidence for the learner to extend 
their language to include statements with ∨-disjunction. The circumstances that 
inform learners that their initial hypothesis about the meaning of disjunction (⊕-
disjunction) was incorrect will be circumstances in which someone utters ‘A or B’ 
when both A and B are true. Grammatical change could take two forms. Learners 
could add to the truth conditions for disjunction, converting ⊕-disjunction into ∨-
disjunction, or learners could add a second meaning to disjunction to their 
grammars, making disjunction ambiguous, with both ⊕-disjunction and ∨-
disjunction. 
 There is a second learnability scenario, according to which learners initially 
guess (wrongly) that the local language is in L2 (with ∨-disjunction) whereas, as a 
matter of fact, the local language uniquely uses ⊕-disjunction. Since A ⊕ B entails 
A ∨ B, learners who made the wrong guess will only encounter evidence 
confirming their initial (wrong) interpretation, at least in the absence of negative 
semantic evidence. This is the familiar learnability dilemma that arises whenever 
an expression has two possible values, one yielding an interpretation that makes 
a sentence true in a superset of circumstances that correspond to the other 
interpretation. If the learner initially guesses the superset language, the evidence 
they encounter will always be consistent with this guess if the local language is 
actually the subset language. This is appropriately labeled the Subset Problem.  
 There are two potential ways to avoid the Subset Problem. One is to ensure 
that learners start out with the more restricted meaning, the subset interpretation. 
In the case of disjunction, the more restrictive meaning is ⊕-disjunction. As we 
saw, if it turns out that the local language (also) uses ∨-disjunction, then there 
will be positive evidence informing learners that their grammars need to 
accommodate ∨-disjunction. The other solution is to deny the existence of a 
Subset Problem. Essentially, this amounts to claiming that learners initially guess 
that the local language uses ∨-disjunction, and they are always correct because, 
as a contingent fact, all human languages use ∨-disjunction, and no languages 
use ⊕-disjunction. Of course, it is conceivable that some languages have two 
meanings of disjunction, i.e. both ∨-disjunction and ⊕-disjunction. However, if 
learners initially hypothesize ∨-disjunction as their initial interpretation of 
disjunction, then statements that correspond to the truth conditions associated 
with ⊕-disjunction will be covered whether or not the language also has ⊕-
disjunction. In fact, if this learnability scenario is correct, then it is unclear why 
any language would need to express both kinds of disjunction, since learners’ 
initial guess, ∨-disjunction, already handles the subset of circumstances 
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associated with ⊕-disjunction.  
 Despite these observations, the hypothesis that OR is uniquely ∨-disjunction 
in human languages is not widely accepted. Many linguists and philosophers 
think that at best, disjunctive words like English or are ambiguous between ⊕-
disjunction and ∨-disjunction and, at worst, that disjunctive words in human 
languages uniquely mean ⊕-disjunction and not ∨-disjunction. Our own position 
is, following Grice (1975), that disjunction in human language is (exclusively) ∨-
disjunction — inclusive–or (cf. Gazdar 1979, McCawley 1981, Pelletier 1972). In 
the next section we consider simple counter-evidence to this position. The 
counter-evidence takes two forms: (i) objections based on mutual exclusivity, and 
(ii) situational contexts where OR appears to violate de Morgan’s laws, which are 
based on ∨-disjunction.  
 
 
3. How Many ORs Are There? 
 
There are many human language constructions that require inclusive–or, i.e. ∨-
disjunction. In English, simple negative statements with disjunction (in the scope 
of negation) require this interpretation. So, Max didn’t order sushi or pasta means 
that Max didn’t order sushi and Max didn’t order pasta. We will refer to this as 
the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the scope of negation. In classical 
logic, this interpretation follows from one of de Morgan’s laws: ¬(A ∨ B) ⇒ (¬A 
∧ ¬B). The critical point is that this law assumes that disjunction is inclusive–or. 
To the extent that human languages yield conjunctive interpretations in negated 
disjunctions, then disjunction is inclusive–or in human languages. If the sentence 
Max didn’t order sushi or pasta meant that Max didn’t order sushi ⊕ pasta, then the 
statement would be true if Max ordered both sushi and pasta, clearly the wrong 
result for simple negative sentences with disjunction in English (cf. Barrett & 
Stenner 1971).  
 But what about the corresponding positive sentence Max ordered sushi or 
pasta? For most English speakers, this means that Max either ordered sushi or he 
ordered pasta, but not both. This is not evidence that or is ⊕-disjunction, 
however. Following Grice (1975), we can account for the appearance that human 
languages express disjunction using exclusive–or as well as inclusive–or by 
invoking pragmatic norms of conversation, which sometimes eliminate one of the 
truth conditions of inclusive–or, namely the condition in which both disjuncts are 
true. In a nutshell, the Gricean account maintains that sentences of the form ‘A or 
B’ are subject to an implicature of exclusivity, i.e. ‘A or B, but not both A and B’. 
The implicature of exclusivity arises due to the availability of another statement, 
‘A and B’, which is more informative. ‘A and B’ is more informative because it is 
true in only one set of circumstances, whereas ‘A or B’ is true in those 
circumstances, but it is true in other circumstances as well. Due to the overlap of 
truth conditions, the expressions or and and form a scale based on information 
strength, with and being more informative than or (e.g., Horn 1969, 1996). A 
pragmatic principle Be Cooperative entreats speakers to be as informative as 
possible. Upon hearing someone use the less informative term on the scale, or, 
listeners assume that the speaker was being cooperative and they infer that the 
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speaker was not in position to use the more informative term and. Therefore, the 
speaker’s use of the less informative term is taken by listeners to imply the 
negation of the more informative term: ‘not both A and B’.  
 Several challenges to this account of the ‘not both’ interpretation of 
disjunction have been offered, and we will briefly rehearse them now, indicating 
how Grice’s account withstands the challenges. First, it has been observed that 
there are many circumstances in which the exclusive–or reading of disjunction is 
the only available reading, not just the preferred reading. Such cases are quite 
common in the input to children. Adults ask children many questions that make 
it clear that the disjuncts are mutually exclusive. Here are some examples from 
the input to Adam in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000): Was it a big one 
or a small one? — Did you find it or did Robin find it? — Is it a happy face or a sad face? 
Assuming that English has inclusive–or, it might be suggested that such 
questions demand a second meaning for OR, expressing mutual exclusivity (e.g., 
Kegley & Kegley 1978, Richards 1978).  
 The force of this argument is weak. According to the truth conditions 
associated with inclusive–or, statements of the form ‘A or B’ are true in 
circumstances in which only A, or only B, is true. Contexts in which the disjuncts 
are mutually exclusive are therefore consistent with the inclusive–or reading of 
disjunction. Of course, such contexts are not consistent with all the truth 
conditions associated with inclusive–or, since faces cannot be both happy and sad 
at the same time. But, someone who poses the question Is it a happy face or a sad 
face? assumes that it was either happy or sad, and both of these truth conditions 
are consistent with inclusive–or. As we saw, the inclusive–or interpretation of 
disjunction is true in a superset of the conditions that are associated with 
exclusive–or , so any truth conditions that would be associated with an exclusive–
or meaning (were this available to children) would be consistent with the 
inclusive–or interpretation of disjunction. So, if the basic meaning of disjunction 
is inclusive–or, there would be no need to coin a second term, or assign an 
independent meaning to OR, to be used in circumstances corresponding to 
exclusive–or .  
 A similar observation concerns the interpretation of disjunction in the 
presence of other logical operators, such as negation. An example is Max did not 
order noodles — or (was it) rice?. The idea is that the introduction of a pause, or by 
altering the prosody, one can indicate an exclusive–or reading, in direct violation 
of de Morgan’s laws. Since de Morgan’s laws depend on the inclusive–or reading 
of disjunction, such violations appear to call for a second meaning, i.e. one 
corresponding to exclusive–or. In our view, the issue here is one of scope, not 
ambiguity. The introduction of a pause, or a change in intonation, is taken by 
hearers as indicating that disjunction has scope over negation, and not the 
reverse. It is as though one had said: It was noodles — or (was it) rice that Max 
didn’t order. De Morgan’s laws are not operative when the scopal relation 
between negation and disjunction are reversed in this way, with disjunction 
having scope over negation.1 In section 6, we offer an account of the ‘inverse 
                                                
    1 De Morgan’s laws are not the only laws that fail for exclusive disjunction. The Distributive 
Law ‘A or B and C is equivalent to A or B and A or C’ is another notable failure. Thus, 
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scope’ reading of disjunction that crops up in simple negative sentences in some 
human languages.  
 
 
4. ‘Weakening’ as Evidence for Exclusive–or  
 
There is a more serious potential challenge to the claim that the unique meaning 
of disjunction in human languages is inclusive–or. The challenge is predicated on 
the observation that the introduction rule for disjunction (known appropriately 
as ‘Weakening’) is typically judged to be unacceptable by adults. The intro-
duction rule permits one to validly infer a statement of the form ‘A or B’ from a 
statement of the form ‘A’. So, if one has evidence for A, one can logically infer A 
or B, regardless of the truth value assigned to B. This rule of inference is only 
valid if the disjunction operator in the statement ‘A or B’ is inclusive–or, since A ∨ 
B is a logical consequence of A, both when B is true and when B is false.  
 
(1)     A 
 A ∨ B 
 
Similarly, A ∨ B is a logical consequence of B, regardless of the truth value of A. 
 
(2)     B 
 A ∨ B 
 
If the meaning of disjunction is ⊕-disjunction, by contrast, the introduction rule 
of Weakening is not valid. On this interpretation of disjunction, exactly one 
disjunct can be true, so A ⊕ B cannot be inferred from evidence that A is true 
when B is also true. This contrasts with the formula using inclusive disjunction, A 
∨ B, which is true if both A and B are true. The upshot is, one way to explain why 
Weakening is not accepted by language users is to suppose that the meaning of 
disjunction in human languages is exclusive–or and not inclusive–or. 
 There is, however, another way to account for the observation that people 
do not find the introduction rule for disjunctive statements acceptable. This 
account appeals to the pragmatic norms people follow in discourse, as sketched 
above. It is simply odd, pragmatically, for language users to produce two 
statements, the first more informative than the second. This is exactly what 
happens with the simple introduction rule for disjunction. First, one encounters 
A, then A or B. But, someone who produces A or B implies that s/he was not in 
position to produce either A, or B. It is therefore, pragmatically infelicitous to find 
A followed by A or B.  
 To adjudicate between these accounts of the unacceptability of Weakening, 
we propose to recast the Weakening inference rule in a way that makes it 
acceptable to ordinary speakers, by reducing the pragmatic infelicity associated 
                                                                                                                                 
whilst ‘Either Annie or Bob and Chris will come to the party’, A or (B and C), is true if or 
means ⊕ when Annie and Bob turn up without Chris, the conjunction ‘Annie or Bob and 
Annie or Chris will come to the party’, (A or B) and (A or C) comes out false, since the first 
conjunct turns out false. Had Bob stayed away it would have been true.   
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with the inference rule. Adopting a similar perspective, McCawley (1981: 33) 
argues that Weakening is accepted if it is introduced in a sub-proof of a logical 
derivation, rather than in the main proof. We adopt a different strategy. It is 
possible to reduce or eliminate the pragmatic infelicity of Weakening simply by 
inserting a logical step between the statement that A, and the statement that A or 
B. The step is existential generalization. Existential generalization logically 
follows from certain statements that A, and it logically validates corresponding 
disjunctive statements that A or B. Crucially, by making the introduction rule for 
disjunction indirect, it becomes more palatable for English speakers. Here is a 
version of Weakening that people we have consulted find acceptable.  
 
Consider a domain containing two people, Max and Jon. Suppose 
that Jon laughs, so Lj (Jon laughs) is true. But if Lj is true, then it 
follows that ‘someone laughs’ is true, so ∃xLx is true. Yet, there are 
only two objects in the domain, Max and Jon, so the existential claim 
that ‘someone laughs’ is logically equivalent to the claim that ‘Jon 
laughs or Max laughs’. That is, from ∃xLx, we can infer the truth of 
Lm ∨ Lj. In short, we began with the statement Lj, and derived the 
disjunctive statement Lj or Lm. QED: Weakening holds for OR. 
Therefore OR is ∨-disjunction.  
 
If disjunction is ⊕, it is not logically possible to begin with Lj and to 
derive Lj ⊕ Lm by following a sequence of steps that are each 
logically valid. To see this, suppose that Max laughs along with Jon. 
That is, Lm & Lj holds. Clearly then, Lj holds. As before this validates 
the existential claim ∃xLx. But if Lm and Lj are both true, Lm ⊕ Lj is 
false. QED: Weakening does not hold for ⊕-disjunction. 
 
The indirect argument from Lj (= A) to Lj ∨ Lm (= A or B) shows that the 
introduction rule for disjunction is sound after all. And this, in turn, means that 
disjunction is inclusive–or, at least for English speakers. So the fact that 
Weakening is judged unacceptable by most speakers in its simplest form (i.e. 
moving directly from A to A or B) does not support the conclusion that human 
language disjunction is exclusive–or. Rather, as Grice (1975) proposed, 
Weakening is unacceptable simply because the conclusion is less informative 
than the premise. It is therefore jarring to encounter the premise immediately 
followed by the conclusion. However, by making the route from the premise to 
the conclusion indirect (via Existential Generalization), the validity of the 
Weakening introduction rule becomes apparent. In fact, this version of 
Weakening is an a priori argument that disjunction is inclusive–or, at least in 
English. What about in other human languages?2  
                                                
    2 Jennings (2001) notes that if ⊕ is to serve as an acceptable interpretation of or in English, 
then it cannot be a binary sentential connective since ‘Annie or Bob or Chris will come to the 
party’ is a perfectly acceptable, unambiguous sentence of English. Yet, bizarrely, if or means 
⊕, then this statement will be true if all three turn up! If A, B, C are true, then A ⊕ (B ⊕ C) 
turns out true since (B ⊕ C) will be false. In fact, as Reichenbach (1947) first observed, for ⊕ 
an n-ary connective, ⊕ (α1, … αn) will come out true if and only if an odd number of the 
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5. Weakening Reconsidered 
 
Despite the logical proof we have given that English or is ∨-disjunction, it is 
widely believed that disjunction in human languages is exclusive–or, i.e. ⊕-
disjunction (e.g., Lakoff 1971, Braine & Rumain 1983). For example, although 
Braine & Rumain (1983: 291) acknowledge the view that “equates or with 
standard logic”, they ultimately reject this view on the grounds that “coherent 
judgments of the truth of or-statements emerge relatively late and are not 
universal in adults”. They conclude that disjunction is more often than not, 
exclusive–or even for adults. In the last section, we presented an a priori reason 
for thinking that OR must have an inclusive reading in English. Moreover, we 
believe that the inclusive–or reading of disjunction is no quirk of English. Rather, 
we believe, the introduction rule for disjunction, Weakening, is valid in all 
human languages. In section 5 we present further arguments from cross-
linguistic research for believing that all human languages allow an inclusive–or 
reading of disjunction. First, we reflect further on the a priori argument we 
offered for the claim that inclusive–or is the meaning of disjunction, based on the 
validity of one form of Weakening in English.  
 We began by considering the possibility that Weakening is invalid because, 
as many researchers have claimed, OR means exclusive–or (⊕) in their idiolects, 
and Weakening is invalid for ⊕. To counter this, we offered a validation of 
Weakening which disproves this hypothesis. Here is a variant of our earlier 
argument. If it is valid, it proves that or is inclusive–or, not exclusive–or, in 
English.  
 
(3) (I) Jon laughs and Max laughs. 
 (II) ∴ Jon laughs. 
 (III) ∴ Someone laughs. 
 (IV) ∴ Jon laughs or Max laughs. 
 
Clearly, if it is valid to infer that Jon laughs or Max laughs from Jon laughs and Max 
laughs, then or is not ⊕-disjunction, since A ⊕ B is false if both A and B are true. 
By contrast, A ∨ B is true if both A and B are true, so if the argument is valid, then 
English or is ∨-disjunction. Anyone who thinks that the inference is not valid, in 
any language, however, owes us an explanation as to which step in the inference 
is unsound.  
 Let us consider the steps in turn. Consider first the inference from (I) to (II). 
This is the elimination rule for conjunction, Simplification. This inference is 
uncontentious. To deny that Weakening holds in any human language, then, one 
must either say that (III) does not follow from (II), or that (IV) does not follow 
from (III). Presumably, to deny that Someone laughs follows from Jon laughs, one 
must deny that someone can mean ‘at least one person.’ Putting it another way, 
denying that (III) follows from (II) amounts to the claim that someone must mean 
                                                                                                                                 
sentences αI are true. As Jenning quips, there is no natural use of disjunction in human 
languages which counts A or B or C or D or E true just in case either one or three or all five 
of the disjuncts are true. 
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‘exactly one person.’ That claim cannot be right, however. The reason is that (II) 
Jon laughs is derived from the hypothesis that (I) Jon laughs and Max laughs. Since 
(III) Someone laughs is supposed to follow from (II) Jon laughs by existential 
generalization, that sentence also must rest upon the same hypothesis, (I) Jon 
laughs and Max laughs. But we patently cannot conclude from the hypothesis that 
both Jon and Max laugh that exactly one of them laughs. So someone cannot mean 
‘exactly one’ and must, as required, mean ‘at least one’. So we think the transition 
from (II) to (III) is incontestable in any language. 
 This leaves the final step, from (III) to (IV), as the remaining inference to 
challenge. Supporters of the exclusive–or interpretation of or are already 
committed to denying the inference of (IV) from (III). But it is hard to see how 
this inference could be denied. For it is just bluntly true that, in the circumstance 
where Jon and Max are the only members of the domain, Someone laughs is 
logically equivalent to Jon laughs or Max laughs. This is the human language 
counterpart to the relationship between quantificational operators and logical 
connectives in classical logic: The existential quantifier is disjunctive, and the 
universal quantifier is conjunctive. In classical logic, in a domain with two 
objects, a and b, ∃xPx expands to Pa ∨ Pb; and ∀xPx expands to Pa & Pb. The same 
relationship holds in human languages. So in a domain with two people, Jon and 
Max, the sentence Someone laughs can likewise be expanded to the sentence Jon 
laughs or Max laughs. Anyone informed that the former sentence is true can infer 
that the latter is also true.  
 None of this is surprising to anyone who thinks, as we do, that first order 
logic is the innately given logic of human languages. For the reason that Someone 
laughs can be expanded to Jon laughs or Max laughs is because the underlying 
logical form of the first sentence just is ∃xLx and the underlying logical form of 
the second sentence just is Lj ∨ Lm, so that if there are only two objects j and m in 
our universe of discourse, the existential formula can be replaced at the level of 
logical form by its disjunctive expansion Lj ∨ Lm. For logical nativists, the logical 
entailments that hold between the sentences of a human language just are the 
formal ones holding between the logical forms corresponding to those sentences, 
so there is no problem of trying to find a human language analogue for logical 
concepts and relations.  
 Interestingly, human languages can even wear the relation between 
quantificational operators and logical connectives on their sleeves. Japanese is 
one such language. In Japanese, the disjunction operator is ka and the conjunction 
operator is –mo. These logical operators appear in quantificational expressions in 
Japanese, such that ‘someone’ is formed using the expression for disjunction, and 
‘everyone’ is formed using the expression for conjunction. That is, the equivalent 
of English ‘someone’ in Japanese is dare–ka and the equivalent of English 
‘everyone’ in Japanese is dare–mo.  
 We have seen that, by itself, the inference of Jon laughs or Max laughs (A or 
B) from Jon laughs (A) gives us pause, but it seems compelling when viewed 
through the intermediary of existential generalization. It is very hard to see how 
this could just be a quirk of English, however, since the reasoning that justifies 
Weakening makes no use of semantic properties unique to English words. Rather 
any language that contains an existential quantifier and a disjunction operator 
Is Logic Innate? 
 
33 
will vindicate it.3 To disprove the hypothesis that inclusive disjunction must be 
an admissible interpretation of disjunction in any human language, it would 
have to be shown that there is a language Ln for which either:  
 (i) Existential generalization fails (the inference from II to III), or else 
 (ii) Existential quantification over a finite domain of named objects pro-
duces an existential claim that is not logically equivalent to a finitary 
disjunction (the inference from III to IV).   
Any such human language Ln would be logically unsound. The upshot is that 
human language disjunction must have an inclusive–or interpretation on pain of 
logical incoherence.  
 
 
6. Linguistic Universals with inclusive–or 
 
So far, we have produced an a priori argument supporting the hypothesis that all 
human languages allow an inclusive interpretation of disjunction. If sound, this 
argument establishes that OR, meaning ∨-disjunction, is a universal feature of 
human languages. There is considerable empirical evidence that confirms this 
hypothesis. One source of this evidence is from cross-linguistic research.  
 For a start, it is universally the case that negated disjunctions adhere to de 
Morgan’s law for negated disjunctions: ¬(A ∨ B) ⇒ (¬A ∧ ¬B). In human 
languages, this law applies universally only when negation is in a ‘higher’ clause 
than disjunction. An example is given in (4) where the clause that contains 
disjunction, …John speaks French or Spanish, is embedded in the clause with 
negation, Mary didn’t say…. Semantically, the critical observation is that (4) 
generates a conjunctive entailment, as indicated in (4a); it does not have the 
‘disjunctive’ truth conditions indicated in (4b).  
 
(4)  Mary didn’t say John speaks French or Spanish. 
 a. Mary didn’t say John speaks French and  
  she didn’t say he speaks Spanish. 
 b.     * Mary didn’t say John speaks French or  
  she didn’t say he speaks Spanish. 
 
Remarkably, when (4) is translated into Japanese, Chinese, Russian, and so forth, 
its variants in these other languages also carry conjunctive entailments. Here are 
examples from Chinese (5) and Japanese (6). In both languages, these negated 
disjunctive statements generate a conjunctive entailment.  
 
                                                
    3 We are not claiming that every human language must contain a word corresponding to the 
existential quantifier and a word corresponding to disjunction. The concepts of existential 
quantification and disjunction could be made available to language users indirectly, e.g., 
using negation and universal quantification, as in Not everybody laughed. 
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(5) Chinese 
 Mali meiyou  shuo–guo Yuehan  hui shuo fayu   huozhe  xibanyayu. 
 Mary not   say-PAST John   can speak French or    Spanish 
 瑪麗沒有說過約翰會說法語或者西班牙語 
 ‘Mary didn’t say that John speaks French or Spanish.’ 
 
(6) Japanese 
 Mary–wa  John–ga  French ka Spanish–wo hanas–u–to          iwa–nakat–ta. 
 Mary–TOP John–NOM French  or Spanish–ACC speak–PRES–COMP say–not–PAST 
 ‘Mary didn’t say that John speaks French or Spanish.’  
 
As these examples illustrate, when negation appears in a higher clause than the 
clause that contains disjunction, i.e. not S[A or B], such statements exclude the 
possibility of both A and B, in typologically different languages (cf. Szabolcsi 
2002, Goro 2004). Notice that in the Japanese example (6), the statement takes a 
different form, [A or B]S not, as compared to English and Chinese, not S[A or B]. 
This is because Japanese is verb-final and negation is attached to the verb. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese example has the same truth conditions as the 
examples from English and Chinese. It makes no difference that the disjunction 
operator ka precedes negation in Japanese, whereas or and huozhe follow negation 
in the English and Chinese examples. This shows that the interpretation of 
disjunction does not depend on linear order; what matters is constituent 
structure. In any event, we have derived one candidate for a linguistic universal 
(influenced by the work of Anna Szabolcsi and Takuya Goro): When disjunction 
appears in a lower clause than negation, negated disjunctions license a conjunctive 
entailment.  
 It is implausible to suppose that children learn that disjunction is inclusive–
or in human language based on their exposure to sentences like those in (4), (5), 
and (6). Such sentences are too rare to ensure that every language learner is 
exposed to a sufficient quantity of them to guarantee convergence on the target 
grammar.4 The conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is licensed only if 
disjunction words are interpreted as inclusive–or, as in de Morgan’s laws of 
classical logic. De Morgan’s laws apply, of course, if and only if the negation 
operator is acting upon disjunction. To illustrate, consider the following two 
sentences, and their associated logical forms, where ‘Dx’ stands for x is a delegate, 
‘Sx’ for x ate sushi, ‘Px’ for x ate pasta, and ‘Ix’ for x became ill. 
 
(7) Not every delegate who ate sushi or pasta became ill. 
  ¬ ∀x[(Dx & (Sx ∨ Px)) → Ix] 
 
(8) Not every delegate who became ill ate sushi or pasta. 
  ¬ ∀x[(Dx & Ix) → (Sx ∨ Px)] 
                                                
    4 As we discuss in section 5, a similar cross-linguistic generalization does not extend to simple 
negative sentences with disjunction, such as Ted didn’t eat sushi or pasta. In simple negative 
statements, some languages license conjunctive interpretations (e.g., English, German), but 
other languages do not (e.g., Japanese, Chinese). 
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The role the disjunction ‘Sx ∨ Px’ plays in both of these formulae might look the 
same prior to analysis, but there is a significant difference. In the formula in (7) 
disjunction appears in the antecedent clause of a negated conditional, whereas in 
(8) it appears in the consequent clause of a negated conditional. Thus, when we 
come to reduce each formula further, as in (7’) and (8’) respectively, we see that 
disjunction is no longer in the scope of negation in (7’), but it is in the scope of 
negation in (8’).  
 
(7’) Not every delegate who ate sushi or pasta became ill. 
  ¬ ∀x[(Dx & (Sx ∨ Px)) → Ix] 
   ⇔∃x ¬ [(Dx & (Sx ∨ Px)) → Ix]  
  ⇔∃x[(Dx & (Sx ∨ Px)) & ¬ Ix] 
           
(8’) Not every delegate who became ill ate sushi or pasta. 
  ¬ ∀x[(Dx & Ix) → (Sx ∨ Px)] 
  ⇔∃x ¬ [(Dx & Ix) → (Sx ∨ Px)] 
  ⇔∃x [(Dx & Ix) & ¬ (Sx ∨ Px)] 
  ⇔∃x [(Dx & Ix) & ¬ Sx & ¬Px] 
 
Thus negation acts directly on a disjunctive clause only in (8). The reason is that 
in negating conditionals we affirm the antecedent and deny the consequent, since 
this represents the sole condition under which conditionals are false. So if the 
disjunctive clause appears in the antecedent of a conditional, as in (7), it does not 
get negated, whereas if it appears in the consequent, as in (8), it does get negated. 
In human languages, then, disjunction is negated if it appears in the predicate 
phrase of a negated universally quantified statement, but disjunction is not 
negated if it appears in the subject phrase of a negated universally quantified 
statement. Consequently, disjunction licenses a conjunctive entailment in the 
predicate phrase of a negated universally quantified statement, as in (8), but not 
when disjunction appears in the subject phrase of such a sentence, as (7) shows. 
So to say Not every delegate who ate sushi or pasta became ill is to say that at least one 
of the delegates who ate sushi or pasta remained unaffected, and to say Not every 
delegate who became ill ate sushi or pasta is to say that some delegate who became ill 
didn’t eat sushi and didn’t eat pasta (so these foods are ruled out as the source of 
the illness). De Morgan’s laws are thus preserved at the level of logic and also at 
the level of semantic interpretation in human languages.  
 We just noted that disjunction licenses a conjunctive implication in the 
predicate phrase in negated universally quantified statements. This is in striking 
contrast to sentences with the universal quantifier in pre-subject position, but 
without negation. In such cases, disjunction licenses a conjunctive implication in 
the subject phrase, but not in the predicate phrase. As (9) shows for English, 
when disjunction is in subject phrase of a sentence with the downward entailing 
expression every, the sentence yields the entailments (9a) and (9b). Therefore, the 
English statement in (9) generates the conjunctive interpretation indicated in (10), 
which is simply the conjunction of the two entailments (9a) and (9b).  
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(9)  Every student who speaks French or Spanish passed the exam.  
 a. every student who speaks French passed the exam 
 b. every student who speaks Spanish passed the exam 
 
(10)  Every student who speaks French passed the exam and 
  every student who speaks Spanish passed the exam.  
 
It is worth noting, again, that the same linguistic phenomena are manifested 
across human languages. When (9) is translated into Japanese or Chinese (and 
any other language, as far as we know), the corresponding statements also 
generate conjunctive interpretations. This is illustrated in (11) and (12). Example 
(11) shows that the Chinese disjunction operator huozhe licenses a conjunctive 
interpretation when it appears in the subject phrase of the universal quantifier 
meige. Example (12) provides the corresponding sentence in Japanese.  
 
(11) Chinese 
 Meige hui shuo fayu  huozhe xibanyayu de   xuesheng dou 
 every  can speak French or   Spanish  DE   student  DOU 
 tongguo–le  kaoshi. 
 pass–PERF  exam 
 ‘Every student who speaks French or Spanish passed the exam.’ 
 
(12) Japanese 
 Furansugo ka  supeingo–wo hanas–u  dono gakusei–mo goukakushi–ta. 
 French  or  Spanish–ACC speak–PRES every student    pass exam–PAST 
 ‘Every student who speaks French or Spanish passed the exam.’ 
 
In view of this cross-linguistic generalization, a second universal principle is 
postulated (influenced by the work of Gennaro Chierchia): Disjunction licenses a 
conjunctive interpretation when it appears in the subject phrase of the universal 
quantifier.  
 In the next section, we report the findings of a study showing that children 
know this universal principle. But more importantly, children also know where 
disjunction does not license a conjunctive interpretation in human languages. 
Interestingly, when disjunction is in the predicate phrase of a sentence with the 
universal quantifier, it no longer generates a conjunctive interpretation. This is 
illustrated in (13), which has been formed from (9) simply by swapping the 
contents of the subject phrase and the predicate phrase.  
 
(13)  Every student who passed the exam speaks French or Spanish.  
 a.     # every student who passed the exam speaks French 
 b.    # every student who passed the exam speaks Spanish 
 
In (13), the predicate phrase (speaks French or Spanish) contains disjunction, but a 
conjunctive interpretation is not licensed, because neither of the relevant 
entailments, (13a) or (13b), are valid inferences from (13). This asymmetry 
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between the subject and predicate phrase of the universal quantifier extends to 
human languages around the globe and, again, experimental investigations have 
revealed that children are aware, at an early age, that disjunction generates a 
conjunctive interpretation in the subject phrase of the universal quantifier, and 
children are also aware that disjunction does not generate a conjunctive 
interpretation in the predicate phrase of sentences with the universal quantifier. 
 The question naturally arises: how do children figure out that human 
languages interpret OR in one way in the subject phrase of the universal 
quantifier, and a different way in the predicate phrase? As Chierchia (2004: 94) 
remarks “All the action concerns meaning. Morphology or distributional patterns 
play no role”. Chierchia concludes that the “generalization under discussion 
yields a particularly strong version of the poverty of stimulus argument. It is thus 
interesting to find out when exactly the child starts acting in an adult like manner 
[…]” (ibid.). Since poverty of stimulus arguments are the bread and butter of both 
linguistic nativism and logical nativism, it is important to find out if knowledge 
of the asymmetry in the interpretation of disjunction in sentences with the 
universal quantifier emerges early in language development, albeit without 
decisive evidence from experience. We return to this in the next section.  
 First, we offer further confirmation that disjunction is inclusive–or in 
human languages. This confirmation comes from studies of how speakers 
interpret disjunction in sentences with certain focus operators, e.g., English only, 
Japanese dake; Chinese zhiyou. The semantic contribution of such focus operators 
is quite complex. Consider the statement in (14).  
 
(14) Only Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper.   
  
This statement expresses two propositions. Following common parlance, one 
proposition is called the presupposition and the other is called the assertion. Simply 
deleting the focus expression from the original sentence yields the 
presupposition: Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper. For many speakers, 
there is an implicature of exclusivity (‘not both’) in the presupposition (see 
section 3). The second proposition is the assertion. To derive the assertion, the 
sentence can be further partitioned into (i) a focus element and (ii) a contrast set. 
Focus expressions such as only are typically associated with a particular linguistic 
expression somewhere in the sentence. This is the focus element. In (14), the focus 
element is Bunny Rabbit. Typically, the focus element receives phonological 
stress.  
 The assertion is about the contrast set. The members of the contrast set are 
individuals in the domain of discourse that are taken by the speaker and hearer 
to be alternatives to the focus element. These individuals should have been 
introduced into the conversational context before the sentence was produced; 
their existence is presupposed. In the present example, the contrast set consists of 
individuals being contrasted with Bunny Rabbit. The sentence would not be 
felicitous in the absence of such alternatives to Bunny Rabbit. The assertion states 
that the members of the contrast set lack the property being attributed to the focus 
element. In Only Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper, the assertion is the 
following claim: Everybody else (being contrasted with Bunny Rabbit) did not eat a 
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carrot or a green pepper. The critical observation is that disjunction is in the scope 
of (local) negation in the assertion: … did not eat a carrot or a green pepper. Because 
disjunction appears in the scope of negation, it licenses a conjunctive 
interpretation: Everybody else didn’t eat a carrot and everybody else didn’t eat a green 
pepper. As far as we know, disjunction generates a conjunctive interpretation in 
all human languages when it appears in the assertion of sentences with certain 
focus expressions. So, Chinese sentences license a conjunctive interpretation 
when the disjunction operator huozhe appears in the scope of the focus expression 
zhiyou, and Japanese sentences license a conjunctive interpretation when the 
disjunction operator ka is in the scope of the focus expression dake. Therefore, a 
third linguistic universal has been postulated (based on joint work with Takuya 
Goro and Utako Minai): Disjunction generates a conjunctive interpretation in the 
assertion of certain focus expressions in all human languages.  
 This rests our case for concluding that all languages adopt the same 
meaning of OR, namely inclusive–or. We cited three structures that, across 
languages, invoke inclusive–or. In all three cases, moreover, it seems implausible 
that children learn that disjunction is inclusive–or based on their exposure to 
sentences with these structures. These joint observations are relevant for the long-
standing ‘nature versus nurture’ controversy. A linguistic property that (i) 
emerges in human languages without decisive evidence from experience and (ii) 
is common to all human languages is a likely candidate for innate specification. A 
third hallmark of innateness, early emergence, will be discussed in section 7. 
First, though, we wish to consider one way in which languages vary in the 
interpretation they assign to disjunctive statements, in simple negative sentences. 
Since evidence of cross-linguistic variation often accompanies arguments against 
innateness and for an experience-dependent account of language development, it 
is important to show that cases of language variation do not weaken the case for 
logical nativism. Experience matters, of course. As child speakers grow up, they 
must eventually learn to use disjunction in the same way as adults do. But, as we 
will show, the cross-linguistic variation at issue is not compelling evidence that 
disjunction is exclusive–or in any human language.  
 
 
7. Variation in the Interpretation of Disjunction 
 
It is worth asking why we didn’t derive a universal principle invoking simple 
negative sentences such as Max didn’t eat sushi or pasta, with negation and 
disjunction in the same clause. After all, this sentence also licenses a conjunctive 
entailment that Max didn’t eat sushi and Max didn’t eat pasta, at least in English. 
Why was it necessary to add the proviso that negation had to be in a higher 
clause than disjunction in order to ensure that a conjunctive interpretation was 
generated? The problem is that, if we translate the simple English sentence Max 
didn’t eat sushi or pasta into certain other languages, including Japanese, Russian, 
and Hungarian, the corresponding sentences in these languages do not generate 
a conjunctive interpretation. As example (15) illustrates, adult speakers of 
Japanese interpret (15) to mean that the pig didn’t eat the carrot or the pig didn’t 
eat the green pepper. Despite the appearance of the disjunction operator ka under 
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local negation in the surface syntax, ka is interpreted as if it has scope over 
negation. 
  
(15) Japanese 
 Butasan–wa ninjin   ka pi’iman–wo   tabe–nakat–ta. 
 pig–TOP   carrot    or green.pepper–ACC  eat–NEG–PAST 
 ‘The pig didn’t eat the carrot or the pig didn’t eat the green pepper.’ 
 lit.: ‘The pig didn’t eat the carrot or the green pepper.’  
 
Pursuing a suggestion by Szabolcsi (2002), Goro (2004) proposed that languages 
are partitioned into classes by a ‘parameter’. According to this parameter, the 
disjunction operator is a positive polarity item (like English some) in one class of 
languages, but not in another class of languages (including English and German, 
among others). By definition, a positive polarity item must be interpreted as if it 
were positioned outside the scope of negation (OR > NEG), rather than in the 
scope of negation (NEG > OR). The Japanese setting of the parameter is (OR > 
NEG), so a paraphrase of (15) would be: It is a carrot or a green pepper that the pig 
didn’t eat. On this setting of the parameter, negation does not take scope over 
disjunction, so no conjunctive interpretation is generated. On the English setting 
of the parameter (NEG > OR), disjunction is interpreted under negation, so (15) 
would be paraphrased in English as The pig didn’t eat a carrot or a green pepper. In 
this case, a conjunctive entailment is generated.  
 Based on considerations of language learnability, Goro made an intriguing 
prediction — that young Japanese-speaking children would initially generate a 
conjunctive entailment in simple negative disjunctive sentences, in contrast to 
adult speakers of Japanese. The prediction was based on the observation that the 
two settings of the parameter are in a subset/superset relation. Setting aside the 
implicature of exclusivity, on the Japanese/Russian setting of the parameter, (15) 
is (logically) true in three different sets of circumstances; when the pig didn’t eat 
a carrot, but did eat a green pepper, when it didn’t eat a green pepper, but did eat 
a carrot, and when it didn’t eat either one. These are the circumstances associated 
with the inclusive–or interpretation of disjunction when disjunction takes scope 
over negation (OR > NEG). On the English/German setting of the parameter, 
negation takes scope over disjunction (NEG > OR). On this setting, (15) is true in 
just one set of circumstances, namely ones in which the pig didn’t eat either a 
carrot or a green pepper. This parameter setting also invokes the inclusive–or 
interpretation of disjunction. This means that disjunction has the inclusive–or 
interpretation on both settings of the parameter. What changes, according to the 
setting of the parameter, is the scope relations between disjunction and negation.  
 Notice that one setting of the parameter (NEG > OR; English/German) 
makes the statement of (15) true in a subset of the circumstances corresponding 
to the other setting (OR > NEG; Japanese/Russian). The semantic subset principle 
dictates that, whenever parameter values are in a subset/superset relation, the 
language acquisition device compels children to initially select the subset value 
(Crain, Ni & Conway 1994). The semantic subset principle anticipates that the 
subset reading (NEG > OR; English/German) will be children’s initial setting (i.e. 
the default). Based on this line of reasoning, Goro (2004) predicted that children 
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learning Japanese would initially interpret (15) in the same way as English-
speaking children and adults. The prediction was confirmed in an experimental 
investigation of 4- and 5-year-old Japanese-speaking children by Goro & Akiba 
(2004). They found that young Japanese-speaking children consistently licensed a 
conjunctive entailment in response to statements like (15). This empirical finding 
reinforces the conclusion that human languages invoke the inclusive–or meaning 
of disjunction, as in classical logic (Crain, Goro & Thornton 2006). 
 According to the parameter under consideration, there are two classes of 
languages. In one class, which includes Japanese and Chinese, disjunction is a 
positive polarity item; in the other class, which includes English and German, 
disjunction is not a positive polarity item. By definition, a positive polarity item 
must take scope over negation. English some meets this definition of a positive 
polarity item, as (16) illustrates. If some were to be interpreted within the scope of 
negation, then the sentence would mean Ted didn’t eat any kangaroo. Instead, it 
means There is some kangaroo that Ted didn’t eat.  
 
(16) Ted didn’t eat some kangaroo.  
 ‘There is some kangaroo that Ted didn’t eat.’ 
 
Positive polarity items (e.g., English some, Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka) are 
interpreted as having scope over negation just in case the positive polarity item 
and negation are in the same clause. However, if negation appears in a higher 
clause than the one containing the positive polarity item, then negation takes 
scope over the polarity item, as long as negation c-commands disjunction (and 
there are no intervening quantificational expressions). Example (17) illustrates 
this for English some.  
 
(17) You didn’t convince me that Ted ate some kangaroo.  
 ‘You didn’t convince me that Ted ate any kangaroo.’ 
 
If Chinese disjunction operator huozhe and the Japanese disjunction operator ka 
are positive polarity items, as Goro suggests, then Chinese and Japanese should 
be expected to adhere to de Morgan’s laws in sentences in which negation 
appears in a higher clause than the clause that contains huozhe or ka, as we have 
seen.  
 
 
8. Children’s Interpretation of Disjunction 
 
There are several studies showing that young children know that disjunctive 
words in human languages correspond to inclusive–or. We begin with 
disjunction in the scope of focus expressions. Recent experimental research has 
sought to determine whether or not children know the two meaning components 
of sentences with certain focus expressions. In a series of studies (see, e.g., Crain, 
Goro & Minai 2007), we investigated children’s interpretation of or/ka to assess 
their knowledge of the semantics of only/dake. The research strategy was to 
investigate children’s interpretation of disjunction or/ka in the presupposition of 
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sentences with the focus operator only/dake in one experiment, and in the 
assertion in a second experiment. One of the test sentences was (18).  
 
(18) a. Only Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper.        English 
 b. Usagichan–dake–ga ninjin ka  pi’iman–wo   taberu–yo.     Japanese 
  rabbit–only–NOM  carrot  or   green.pepper–ACC eat–DEC   
  ‘Only Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper’  
  Presupposition:  Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper. 
  Assertion:    Everyone else (being contrasted with Bunny Rabbit)  
        did not eat a carrot or a green pepper. 
 
As indicated, the disjunction operators or/ka in (18) yield disjunctive truth con-
ditions in the presupposition. Suppose, then, that children assign the adult inter-
pretation to or/ka in the presupposition. If so, children should accept sentences 
(18) in the situation where Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot but not a green pepper. This 
was Experiment I.  
 In the assertion, or/ka licenses a conjunctive interpretation — everyone else 
did not eat a carrot and did not eat a green pepper. Consequently, if children 
assign the correct interpretation to or/ka in the assertion, they should reject (18) in 
the situation in which Cookie Monster ate a green pepper (while, again, Bunny 
Rabbit ate a carrot but not a green pepper). This is Experiment II. 
 To summarize, if children understand both the presupposition and the 
assertion of Only Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot or a green pepper, then they should 
accept it in Experiment I, but reject it in Experiment II.  
 The experiments in English and Japanese were identical in design, with 
only minimal changes in some of the toy props. The experiment adopted the 
Truth Value Judgment task, in the prediction mode (Chierchia et al. 2001, Crain & 
Thornton 1998). There were two experimenters. One of them acted out the stories 
using the toy props, and the other manipulated the puppet, Kermit the Frog. 
While the story was being acted out, the puppet watched along with the child 
subject. In each trial, the story was interrupted — after the introduction of the 
characters and a description of the situation — so that the puppet could make a 
prediction about what he thought would happen. Then, the story was resumed, 
and its final outcome provided the experimental context against which the 
subject evaluated the target sentence, which had been presented as the puppet’s 
prediction. The puppet repeated his prediction at the end of each story, and then 
the child subject was asked whether the puppet’s prediction had been right or 
wrong.  
 The main finding was that both English-speaking children and Japanese-
speaking children consistently accepted the test sentences in Experiment I in both 
languages, and children consistently rejected the test sentences in Experiment II 
in both. The two groups of children showed no significantly different behavior in 
interpreting disjunction within sentences containing a focus operator, only versus 
dake. The high rejection rate in Experiment II shows that children assigned a 
conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in the assertion of sentences with the 
focus expression only/dake.  
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 Another series of experimental studies investigated children’s knowledge 
of the asymmetrical interpretation of disjunction in sentences with the universal 
quantifier. Several studies have investigated the truth conditions children 
associate with disjunction in the subject phrase and in the predicate phrase of the 
universal quantifier. For example, in studies (e.g., Boster & Crain 1993, Gualmini, 
Meroni & Crain 2003) using the Truth Value Judgment task, children were asked 
to evaluate sentences like (19) and (20), posed by a puppet, Kermit the Frog. 
 
(19) Every woman bought eggs or bananas. 
 
(20) Every woman who bought eggs or bananas got a basket.  
 
In one condition, sentences like (19) were presented to children in a context in 
which some of the women bought eggs, but none of them bought bananas. The 
child subjects consistently accepted test sentences like (19) in this condition, 
showing that they assigned a ‘disjunctive’ interpretation to or in the subject 
phrase of the universal quantifier, every. In a second condition, children were 
presented with sentences like (20) in a context in which women who bought eggs 
received a basket, but not women who bought bananas. The child subjects 
consistently rejected the test sentences in this condition. This finding is evidence 
that children generated a conjunctive interpretation for disjunction in the subject 
phrase of every. This asymmetry in children’s responses in the two conditions 
demonstrates their knowledge of the asymmetry in the two grammatical 
structures associated with the universal quantifier–the subject phrase and the 
predicate phrase. The findings represent a challenge to the experience-dependent 
approach to language acquisition. The challenge is posed by the asymmetry in 
the interpretation of the same disjunction or, in the subject phrase versus the 
predicate phrase of the universal quantifier, since the distinction is one of 
interpretation, not the distribution, of lexical items.  
 The case for logical nativism is also supported by evidence that English-
speaking children respect de Morgan’s laws at an early age. If adults judge that 
negated disjunctions license conjunctive entailments, then children must acquire 
the capacity to make similar judgments as they grow into adulthood. But that 
leaves a lot of time for exposure to a lot of data. But if very young children 
demonstrate knowledge of the semantic principles that characterize adult 
linguistic competence, then that would compress the acquisition problem 
considerably. Of course, no-one can ever prove that 2-year-old children have not 
already utilized a vast range of data, but the case for logical nativism is 
strengthened if it can be demonstrated that 2-year-old children adhere to de 
Morgan’s laws before they are plausibly exposed to the data needed by learning-
theoretic accounts. We will discuss one candidate for a learning-theoretic account 
in the next section. First, we present further empirical evidence for logical 
nativism based on experimental studies of 2-year-old English-speaking children.  
 In an ongoing longitudinal study of four 2-year-olds, we have presented 
them with negated disjunctions, and have recorded their behavioral and verbal 
responses. On a typical trial in one condition, children are shown three dogs, a 
white one, a brown one and a black one. Kermit the Frog, who is manipulated by 
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the experimenter, indicates that he wants to play with a dog. The experimenter 
then holds up the three dogs. Then Kermit says: “I don’t want to play with the 
white dog or the brown dog”. If children adhere to de Morgan’s laws, they are 
expected to give Kermit the black dog. In another condition, negated disjunctions 
are used in wh-questions, such as Who doesn’t have A or B?. On a typical trial, an 
array of characters are introduced, some with yo-yo’s, some with sponge balls, 
and some with strawberries. Then, the target question is posed to children: Who 
doesn’t have a yo-yo or a sponge ball?. One of the youngest children consistently 
responded in conformity with the conjunctive entailment beginning on the very 
first trial, at age 2;3. Other children produced consistent adult-like responses later 
than this, but all four children consistently respond in ways that demonstrate 
knowledge that negated disjunction yield conjunctive entailments by age 2;10. 
The transcripts of parental input reveal that children experience little evidence 
that disjunction is inclusive–or. The vast majority of the input is consistent with 
exclusive–or, so this interpretation would be adopted by many children if it were 
a possible semantic option in human languages. The fact that all four of the 2-
year-olds we have tested have reached the opposite conclusion, that disjunction 
is inclusive–or, supports our claim that inclusive–or emerges in children’s 
grammars in the absence of decisive evidence from experience. Emergence in the 
absence of experience is one of the hallmarks of innateness.  
 In this section, we produced empirical grounds for believing the inclusive–
or interpretation of disjunction is universal and innate. The evidence from young 
children regarding their understanding of negated disjunctions seems 
compelling. Once they understand the meaning of or and ka they assent to the 
conjunctive entailments supported by de Morgan’s laws, even for statements that 
do not obey de Morgan’s laws for adult speakers, as in Japanese. Obviously, 
children do not learn to obey de Morgan’s laws by observing how adults 
interpret disjunction. We think the conclusion to draw is, therefore, that children 
do not learn the meaning of disjunction; they bring knowledge that the meaning 
of disjunction is inclusive–or to the task of language development.5 
 In the next section, we consider what it would actually take for children to 
learn the meaning of disjunction. We will consider how children might learn the 
meaning of logical connectives, including disjunction, by observing how people 
use these connectives in drawing inferences. Once it is laid out for examination, 
such a learning story seems to us to be highly implausible. Then we summon 
some a priori arguments against such learning accounts.  
 
 
                                                
    5 One common argument against the universality of ∨-disjunction is that there is at least one 
language, namely Latin, which has separate words for inclusive and exclusive disjunction, 
vel and aut respectively, so that there is no such thing as the meaning of OR in Latin — in this 
language OR has two meanings, depending on whether it is inclusive or exclusive 
disjunction one has in mind. But Jennings (2001) has convincingly refuted this “mythical 
supposition”, as he calls it. For if aut really did mean ⊕, then negating a sentence such as 
Timebat tribunos aut plebes ‘One feared the magistrates or the mob’ ought to produce a 
sentence meaning that everyone either feared both or neither. But this is not what Nemo 
timebat tribunos aut plebes means at all — it means that no one feared either, precisely as the 
inclusive interpretation of aut predicts.  
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9. Learning by Inference Rules 
 
Some claim that there is a straightforward solution to the language-learning 
problem for a finite logical vocabulary: learning the meanings of logical 
expressions is simply a matter of learning the inferential rules associated with 
these expressions. This is the claim of Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS).6 
Advocates of CRS attempt to explain our knowledge of the meaning of logical 
expressions by exploiting the role these expressions play in inferences. Thus, we 
can imagine that children learn the rules of logic in the same way they learn the 
rules of chess or any other game: someone instructs them in the rules or, more 
likely, they observe the linguistic behaviour of others who know the rules. On 
this account, there are no alternative hypotheses involved, just like the kinds of 
meaning-stipulations that are required for learning “a knight can move two 
squares vertically and one horizontally or two horizontally and one vertically”. 
Admittedly, there is an undeniable appeal to this type of account. And, 
the CRS account could plausibly explain how even young learners come to use 
AND, based on experience. The requisite experience consists of observing the 
patterns of inference that involve AND, namely its introduction rule (&I):  
 
(21) A     B 
 A & B 
 
and its elimination rule (&E):  
 
(22) A & B 
 A     B 
 
All the learner needs to learn the meaning of AND is to be shown these rules, (&I) 
and (&E). No testing of hypotheses is involved, according to CRS.  
 However, an account of meaning via exposure to inference rules does not 
generalize to other logical constants. Consider how children would learn the 
meaning of OR. Earlier we argued that human languages validate the intro-
duction rule for OR, Weakening (∨I) — see (1)–(2). However, English-speaking 
adults find direct statements of Weakening unacceptable, so they are not likely to 
use Weakening in the simple form. Although adults assent to the validity of 
Weakening if this rule is validated for them via a step involving Existential 
Generalization, it is highly implausible that children learn that disjunction is 
inclusive–or by observing adults using this complex form of inference. Even if 
adults were to use disjunction in this way, this kind of input is just too exotic to 
be available in sufficient quantities to ensure that all children learning English, or 
any other language, reach the conclusion that the meaning of disjunction is 
inclusive–or. Therefore, this inference rule is not a likely source of evidence for 
children that the meaning of disjunction is inclusive–or. Yet, as we have seen, 
                                                
    6 The view originated with Wittgenstein’s (1953) thesis that meaning is use and was 
developed further by Sellars (1969). Proponents of CRS today include Block (1986, 1987), 
Brandom (2000), Field (1977, 2001), Harman (1987), Horwich (1998), Miller & Johnson–Laird 
(1976).  
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even 2-year-old English-speaking children seem to have reached just this 
conclusion. 
 This brings us to the elimination rule for disjunction, (∨E): 
 
(23)     [A]  [B] 
        .          . 
      .          . 
      .          . 
 
 A ∨ B        C        C 
    C 
 
Disjunction Elimination (∨E) works in the following way: To prove that some 
conclusion C follows from a disjunction A ∨ B, we need to establish that C follows 
from each of the disjuncts A, B in turn. If so, then C must follow from the 
disjunction A ∨ B since it has been shown that, irrespective of which specific 
disjunct holds, C follows. The disjuncts are bracketed to indicate that we are not 
committed to them by the end of our demonstration — they are ‘discharged’, i.e. 
removed from the list of assumptions to which we are committed.  
 Here is a simple illustration. Suppose we wish to show Alice did not hear the 
telephone can be derived from the disjunctive claim Alice was out of the house or 
Alice was fast asleep. We proceed by first assuming the left hand disjunct (LH), 
Alice was out, showing that if she was out, then she would not have heard the 
telephone in the house ring. We then assume the right hand disjunct (RH) Alice 
was fast asleep. Knowing how soundly Alice sleeps, we are able to derive the 
conclusion that she would not have heard the phone from the assumption that 
she was fast asleep. We don’t know whether she was out at that time or fast 
asleep, but let’s suppose since on either alternative she would not have heard the 
telephone ring, we have established that C Alice did not hear the telephone follows 
from Alice was either out of the house or fast asleep. Clearly, we are not committed to 
believing categorically that she was out nor are we categorically committed to 
believing she was fast asleep. We’re committed only to believing that one or the 
other alternative held, i.e. we’re committed to believing the disjunction Either 
Alice was out of the house or fast asleep. So we discharge both disjuncts Alice was out, 
and Alice was asleep. 
 We can formally vindicate the requisite conjunctive entailment of ¬A & ¬B 
by ¬(A ∨ B) as follows: 
 
1.   ¬(A ∨ B) Assumption     6.    B     Hypothesis 
2.   A    Hypothesis     7.    A ∨ B   6 ∨I 
3.   A ∨ B  2 ∨I       8.    ⊥     1, 7 &I 
4.   ⊥    1, 3 &I      9.    ¬B    6, 8 RAA 
5.   ¬A   2, 4 RAA     10.  ¬A & ¬B  5, 9 &I 
 
The child whose knowledge of the meaning of OR consisted in knowledge of the 
inference rules of or-introduction and or-elimination would know that the 
meaning of the English word or is inclusive–or. Yet even if these particular 
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inference rules for or are constitutive of the meaning of OR, it is quite another 
matter to conclude that these inferences rules are available in the primary lingu-
istic data (PLD) to which children are exposed. Disjunction Elimination, (∨E), in 
particular is a highly sophisticated rule that young adults typically struggle with 
in the logic classes. Why would young adults struggle if, as children, they tacitly 
grasped this inference rule when they first learned the meaning of OR? It is even 
less plausible to suppose that young children should have any idea of the 
discharge of assumptions or sub-derivations. But such knowledge is a prerequi-
site to understanding the bare notion of disjunction using Disjunction Elimi-
nation.  
 A simpler Elimination Rule for disjunction, Disjunctive Syllogism, presents 
itself as a far more plausible candidate for something a child might learn that 
could serve to fix the meaning of OR: 
 
(24) A ∨ B       ¬A 
    B 
 
Disjunctive Syllogism, unlike Disjunction Elimination, seems highly learnable. 
The ‘elimination of alternatives’ would seem to be a fairly primitive conceptual 
resource. It has been suggested that it is available even to creatures far simpler 
than humans. It is reasonable to suppose that a pattern of inference that plausibly 
predates the advent of language would be made explicit in the logic of human 
languages, and recognized as sound by young language-learners. If this were 
indeed so then there would no longer be any need for the child to acquire the 
concept of disjunction by learning the meaning of OR since s/he would already 
possess the concept in using elimination of alternatives. Even if this speculation 
were to prove wrong, however, Disjunctive Syllogism could not by itself fix the 
meaning of OR since it holds for both inclusive and exclusive disjunction and thus 
fails to distinguish between them.  
 So far, we have concluded that the child’s PLD is unlikely to contain 
instances of those inference rules, such as Weakening and Disjunction 
Elimination, that could serve as the basis for learning the meaning of OR. We 
established earlier that language-users are committed to Weakening as a sound 
form of inference governing their understanding of OR even if they do not in general 
recognize this fact. But in light of this latter point, Weakening is highly unlikely to 
appear in the primary (or other) linguistic data available to the child, so it cannot 
serve to fix the meaning of OR. Of the two Elimination Rules canvassed for OR, 
Disjunction Elimination and Disjunctive Syllogism, the former is wildly 
implausible as a possible route for a child to acquire the meaning of OR, because 
of its sheer conceptual complexity. Disjunctive Syllogism failed for exactly the 
opposite reason: given the pre-linguistic child’s reasoning proclivities, its 
conceptual simplicity suggests it might already be available to the child prior to 
any acquisition of the meaning of OR. Yet, regardless, it is too weak by itself to fix 
the meaning of OR since it does not distinguish the exclusive reading of 
disjunction from the inclusive one.  
 In sum, the account of learning offered by CRS seems implausible, with the 
possible exception of the acquisition of the meaning of conjunction. Such worries 
Is Logic Innate? 
 
47 
pale into insignificance, however, when compared to Prior’s (1978) famous 
problem for CRS accounts of the logical constants. Prior invented a logical 
constant ‘TONK’ with the following introduction and elimination rules: 
 
(25)               A           B  
 (TONK I)  A TONK B         A TONK B 
 
(26)     A TONK B    A TONK B 
 (TONK E)         A                B 
 
Prior then used these inference rules to prove that any two arbitrary sentences 
were identical: 
 
(27)              [A]1     [B]2  
 (TONK I)  A TONK B         A TONK B 
 
 (TONK E)        B         A 
 (1, 2 ↔ I)             A ↔ B   
 
Of course, TONK is an incoherent rule. It grafts the introduction rule for OR onto 
the elimination rule for ‘and’. Prior’s point was that a purely inferentialist 
account of the meaning of the logical constants, such as CRS, doesn’t have the 
resources to say what is wrong with the acquisition of the meaning of TONK. We 
think what has gone wrong with CRS is that nature hasn’t designed us to be CRS 
machines. Instead, it has engineered us through evolution to be creatures with 
rich conceptual resources to check the reliability of our mental representations. 
The upshot is that CRS does not, in principle, provide an adequate model of how 
language-learners acquire the meanings of logical constants such as OR. Of 
course, we think the meanings are not learned at all, but are innately specified. 
We now proceed to offer two a priori arguments for logical nativism, one based 
on Quine’s (1979) critique of logical positivism, and one based on Fodor’s (1980) 
argument for the innateness of primitive lexical concepts.   
 
 
10. Quine’s Critique of Truth by Convention 
 
Like the rest of his logical positivist peers, Carnap (1937) sought to account for 
the necessity of logical and mathematical truths. Carnap offered a linguistic 
account of necessity: The necessary truths of a given language L are simply those 
generated by linguistic stipulations that determine L, stipulations that are purely 
conventional. Moreover, it is because necessary truths are really disguised 
linguistic stipulations that they can be known a priori to be true. For the logical 
positivists, necessary truths are true irrespective of how the world happens to be 
since they are true in virtue of meaning.  
 Take the logical truth known as the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC): ‘It is 
not the case that p and not p are both true’. According to Carnap, once we know 
what the logical operators NOT and AND mean, we have a priori knowledge of the 
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truth of the LNC: It simply follows from the meanings of NOT and AND.  
 Quine’s objection was simplicity itself. The conventionalist account just 
rehearsed makes essential use of the notion of ‘follows from’, i.e. of logical 
consequence. So, according to the Carnapian account of logical necessity, our a 
priori knowledge of logical truths does not simply arise from our knowledge of 
the conventional linguistic meanings we have adopted to define the logical terms 
NOT and AND. To get from these linguistic conventions to the truth of LNC we 
must appeal to an already understood notion of logical consequence. Now either 
this nascent understanding of logical consequence is a priori or it is not.   
 (I) If it is a priori, then some a priori knowledge cannot be explained 
conventionally. 
 (II) If it is not a priori then our knowledge of at least some necessary 
truths cannot be explained by means of linguistic conventions.   
Either way, the conventionalist account of logical truth breaks down. Meaning-
stipulations (conventions) by themselves thus fail to secure any truths, even 
language-relative ones such as the logical truths were held to be. Quine admitted 
that so-called logical truths, such as LNC, had a different status from ordinary 
truths that are learned from experience. But, Quine had an alternative account of 
the special status of truths such as LNC. To characterize the contrast, Carnap 
endorsed (28), Quine argued for (29).  
 
(28) The reason we know that LNC holds, and holds of necessity, is that A & ¬A 
is a contradiction, and thus cannot possibly be true. 
 
(29) The reason we know that LNC holds, and holds with such tenacity, is that 
it is a strongly held belief that experience would never force us to conclude 
that A & ¬A holds true. 
 
So there are two possible explanations about the epistemic status of LNC. 
Carnap’s explanation is that, having learned the conventional meanings ‘¬’ and 
‘&’, we know a priori that the LNC is true without investigating what the world is 
like. By contrast, Quine’s explanation is that the LNC, along with other 
fundamental logical and mathematical truths, occupies a privileged position in 
our web of belief purely because that web is so structured that the logico-
mathematical truths lie at its core, well-insulated from the impact of experience. 
Another way to frame the contrast in epistemic status is to consider it from the 
vantage point of the learner. Assuming that the learner comes to know somehow 
that ¬ [A & ¬A], two possibilities arise for the learner:  
 
(i) Is ¬ (A & ¬A) true because it could never be correct to assert A & ¬A? 
(ii) Is ¬ (A & ¬A) true simply because I never hear A & ¬A asserted? 
 
The problem with (ii) is that it invites the learner to infer that p is untrue on the 
grounds of a (persistent) absence of evidence for p. That is a risky inference, to 
say the least. So the learner should guess that (i) is likely to be right — he never 
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hears A & ¬A because there is something amiss with its assertion: It would never 
be correct to assert it. But the question is why, and Carnap and Quine return 
opposite answers, (28) and (29). Quine cannot endorse (i). According to Quine, 
knowing that you could not as a matter of principle ever hear A & ¬A asserted 
sneaks in a notion of knowing that certain statements are semantically illicit — 
that is, it sneaks in an implicit notion of logical incoherence in the form of a 
contradiction. So, Quine could endorse (ii) which claims that, as a matter of fact, 
we never hear anyone saying A & ¬A. Despite their differences, both Carnap and 
Quine agreed on one thing — that the meanings of logical expressions such as 
NOT and AND are learned. For Quine, these were learned through observation of 
the assent and dissent dispositions of speakers. For Carnap these were learned 
through understanding the implicit conventions (stipulations) governing the 
meanings of these terms.  
 In a further critique of Carnap, Putnam (1975) added another argument, 
similar in spirit to the argument by Quine, but more relevant for our purposes, 
because Putnam’s argument challenges the common assumption of both Quine 
and Carnap — that knowledge of logical truths can be learned. According to 
Putnam, Carnap’s account of logical truth in terms of meaning-stipulations or 
conventions cannot be correct for the simple reason that the entire set of 
meaning-stipulations M could only be finite (or else recursive), whereas the 
entire set of logical truths T is infinite. So the question arises as to how T is to be 
generated from M. The only way this could be done is by deriving the elements 
of T from the elements of M — that is, by making use of the notion of logical 
consequence. Since it was precisely the notion of logical consequence that was 
supposed to be explicated by the meaning-convention approach, that approach is 
viciously circular.  
 Putnam is obviously correct in pointing out that the learner can only ever 
receive finitely many ‘instructions’ (either as to the meaning-stipulations or as to 
the assent-dissent dispositions of adults with respect to logical expressions). But 
the critical observation is that the learner somehow develops an unbounded 
competence in logic, on the basis of fragmentary experience. In the present article 
we have demonstrated that this human logical competence is both universal and 
emerges very early in children. These arguments, of course, are nothing other 
than an instance of Chomsky’s familiar poverty of the stimulus argument for the 
language faculty (see, e.g., Crain & Pietroski 2002, Crain, Gualmini & Pietroski 
2005, and Pietroski & Crain, in press). The difference is that it is applied to logic 
competence, rather than linguistic competence.  
 As counter-point to Putnam, Noam Chomsky and his followers ask how 
learners acquire knowledge that an unbounded number of strings are associated 
with certain meanings, and could never be associated with other meanings. Take 
a familiar example. In the string He danced while Max ate pizza, the pronoun he 
cannot refer to Max; it must refer to some unmentioned male individual. Where 
does the knowledge come from about what such sentence cannot mean? Again, 
there are two possibilities for the learner:  
 
(iii)  Is ¬ (he = Max) true because it could never be correct that (he = Max)?  
(iv)  Is ¬ (he = Max) true simply because I never hear strings where (he = Max)? 
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The critical point is that children know an unbounded number of such linguistic 
facts, such as the disjoint reference facts about pronouns and referential noun 
phrases. And children acquire knowledge of such facts despite having only 
fragmentary and often misleading evidence, as we have seen in the case of OR. In 
the case of pronouns and names, misleading data are abundant, consisting of 
examples which are similar in meaning, but in which the name precedes the 
pronoun (Max danced while he ate pizza), and where the pronoun precedes the 
name, but appears in a subordinate clause (e.g., While he danced Max ate pizza). Of 
course, this is just one example. For others, see Thornton (1990), Crain & Pietroski 
(2001), and Thornton (2007).   
 It is remarkable, then, to find that young children implicitly conclude that 
certain sentence meanings are ‘necessarily’ correct, permitting children to make 
judgments about entailments, contradictions, paraphrase, and ambiguity. 
Augmented by evidence that such linguistic phenomena are universal, and 
mastered by very young children, it has been argued that there is an innate 
Language Faculty (for a recent statement, see Pietroski & Crain, in press). We 
have presented a similar set of arguments for an innate Logic Faculty, based on 
the universality and early emergence of knowledge that disjunction is inclusive–
or in human languages.  
 
 
11. Mad Dog Logical Nativism 
 
Fodor (1980) produced a notorious argument that is purported to prove every 
primitive lexical concept is innate. This is often referred to as Mad Dog Nativism. 
Whilst Mad Dog Nativism may be mistaken for lexical concepts, there is 
something right about the form of Fodor’s original argument in favour of it: 
properly construed, the argument provides a good reason for believing, not that 
all primitive lexical concepts like TURNIP and CARBURETOR are innate, but that 
primitive logical lexical concepts like DISJUNCTION and NEGATION are innate. 
Fodor’s argument proceeded as follows: 
 
 1. All concepts are either learned or innate. 
 2. If learned, a concept must be acquired through hypothesis-testing. 
 3. Any concept acquired via hypothesis-testing is a logically structured concept. 
 4. Primitive Lexical concepts are not logically structured. 
 5. So, Primitive Lexical concepts are not acquired via hypothesis-testing. 
 6. Hence, Primitive Lexical concepts are not learned. 
 7. Thus, Primitive Lexical concepts are innate. 
 
It is unclear from Fodor’s presentation whether he thinks that primitive lexical 
concepts are unlearnable due to their primitive status, or due to their acquisition 
through hypothesis-testing. We think the status of lexical concepts as primitive 
(or derived) is a red herring when it comes to issues of learnability. What matters 
for learnability is not whether the learning net catches the little fish of primitive 
or unstructured concepts, what matters is the composition of the net. 
 In our view, however, Fodor’s argument raises a genuinely significant issue 
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concerning hypothesis-testing and its relation to learning. First, an obvious point 
needs to be borne in mind in any discussion of concept acquisition. Without 
having acquired the concept, say FROG, a learner, say Ollie, can think no thoughts 
with froggy content. That is, Ollie cannot think thoughts like frogs are slimier than 
mice or I’d much rather play with a frog than with a rat! No frog concept, no frog 
thoughts. Without having acquired the concept FROG, Ollie also cannot frame a 
frog hypothesis like I get it! Claude is talking about frogs when he says ‘grenouille’! 
Nor can he use any special tacit knowledge about frogs in testing various 
hypotheses about the meaning of the French word grenouille or the English word 
frog. 
 The reason we refrain from endorsing Fodor’s argument in its full 
generality can be illustrated by the frog-case. Ollie can acquire the concept of 
FROG by linking the word frog to other non-FROG concepts he has which he can 
use to identify frogs — for example, those funny pop-eyed green hopping things, or 
even those things (Ollie is pointing at some frogs). Fodor himself allows that Ollie 
will have mastered the concept FROG if his mental tokens of the word frog are 
causally linked in the right way to frogs. So, at least when the primitive lexical 
concepts pick out recurrent features of the language-learner’s environment, there 
seems to be no special reason why our language-learner has to deploy the 
concept itself in hypotheses designed to settle the meaning of the lexical 
expression denoting that concept. Perhaps for Ollie to acquire the concept of 
FROG it will suffice if he has some innate primitive concepts, colour concepts, 
natural kinds, motion verbs, and so forth. Based on such innate primitive 
concepts, we see no reason, in principle, to suppose that other concepts, like frog, 
turnip and carburator, cannot be acquired rather than being innate.  
 So Fodor’s premise (3) does not seem generally correct. Nonetheless, there 
may be specific cases for which it does hold, and we claim that logic is precisely 
one such case. So we need to recast Fodor’s argument, applying it specifically to 
primitive logical concepts rather than primitive lexical concepts. The argument for 
Mad Dog Logical Nativism proceeds as follows: 
 
 
 1’. All logical concepts are either learned or innate. 
 2’. If learned, a logical concept is acquired through hypothesis-testing. 
 3’. If a logical concept is acquired through hypothesis-testing, neither the 
formulation of the hypothesis nor the methods used to test it can invoke the 
concept. 
 4’. In determining the meaning of a term denoting a primitive logical concept, 
learners make use of the concept to be acquired, if not in framing the hypothesis 
then in testing it. 
 5’. So, primitive logical concepts cannot be acquired through hypothesis-testing. 
 6’. Therefore, primitive logical concepts are not learned. 
 7’. And, therefore, primitive logical concepts are innate. 
 
To many ears, perhaps even to most, the conclusion 7’ may sound incredible. If it 
is wrong, though, there must be something amiss in the argument. The 
suspicious premises seem to be 2’, 3’, or 4’. Indeed, 2’ looks a tad suspicious — 
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two-year-olds are not scientists; so whatever goes on inside their heads when 
they learn the meanings of words, it is not by theory construction. While 2’ 
stands in need of defense, it is not overturned by such simple considerations: 
Two-year-old theory construction could be worlds away in conceptual sophisti-
cation from theory construction by scientists, yet it could still be, for all that, 
genuine theory construction. For example, if Ollie initially thinks or means the 
same as and and later corrects this, he has surely revised his conjecture about the 
meaning of or. 
 As for 3’, if Ollie has not yet acquired the concept OR, he cannot frame a 
hypothesis that is an OR-thought (a disjunctive thought). He cannot think I get it! 
Claude is talking about alternatives when he says ‘ou’! Neither can he use any special 
tacit knowledge about alternatives in testing various hypotheses about the 
meaning of the French word ou or the English or. Indeed, he cannot even 
recognize alternative hypotheses as alternatives. 
 What about 4’? Does the formulation of a hypothesis about the meaning of 
French ou or English or require the use of the concept of disjunction? It is not at 
all obvious that it does. Suppose Ollie hears A or B a lot, in circumstances in 
which only A is true, or only B is true. After a while, he could use indirect 
negative evidence (e.g., that he hasn’t heard A or B used when both A and B are 
true, or when both are false) to infer that these circumstances make such 
sentences false. Then, Ollie will have learned that disjunction has the truth 
conditions associated with exclusive–or .  
 However, one persistent criticism of truth-conditional semantics has been 
that the truth-conditions of logically complex sentences are only intelligible to 
someone who already possesses the relevant logical concepts.7 Thus the truth-
conditions for OR statements that Ollie learns can be summarized as: “A or B is 
true if and only if either A is true or B is true”. According to this view, these 
truth-conditions are not intelligible to Ollie unless he already possesses the 
concept of disjunction, which was precisely what he was supposed to have 
acquired through learning the meaning of the word or. 
 Let’s consider the method Ollie used to acquire the meaning of OR. When 
Ollie worked out that or meant exclusive–or, we must suppose that he learned 
what or means without engaging an innate concept of disjunction. It follows that 
no consideration of alternative hypotheses could have played any role in his 
hypothesis-testing.  
 That is, he could not have recognized H1: “A or B means at least one of A or 
B is true”, as against H2: “A or B means exactly one of A or B is true” as 
alternatives, weighed up evidence pro–and–con for each, etc. But then, if he did not 
do any of that, how was his acquisition of the concept of disjunction (or the 
meaning of OR) a case of hypothesis-testing? So, if learning really is hypothesis-
testing, as is widely assumed, how did Ollie learn that or meant exclusive–or? The 
critical point is that, quite generally, it seems that rich logical resources must be 
ascribed to the linguistic novice for him to learn anything, meanings or concepts 
                                                
    7 Cf. Dummett’s (1977: 114) complaint that a ‘modest’ theory of meaning containing clauses 
such as the above for disjunction “merely exhibits what it is to arrive at an interpretation of 
one language via an understanding of another, which is just what a translation manual does, 
it does not explain what it is to have mastery of a language”. 
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included.  
 The challenge to opponents of logical nativism is how to accommodate the 
learning-as-hypothesis-testing problem without supposing innateness. We have 
already seen that the most obvious alternative to learning–as–hypothesis–testing 
doesn’t fly. This was the case of learning the logical operators using the primitive 
inference rules that govern their introduction and elimination. This approach was 
appealing, since the logical vocabulary amounts to little more than five or six 
essential words not, and, or, if, all, some, and the primitive inference rules only add 
up to about double that number. But, we have seen that this alternative account 
of learning is fraught with empirical and conceptual problems.  
 At present, we see no plausible alternative to logical nativism. Empirical 
evidence from child language (including 2-year-old children) and cross-linguistic 
research (from typologically different languages) supports logical nativism, and 
several a priori arguments provide additional grounding. A priori arguments that 
logic must be innate are even stronger than scientific ‘abductive’ inferences from 
the empirical evidence gathered in investigations of child language, and cross-
linguistic research. If any such argument is sound, logical nativism would remain 
true even if language-learners were given unlimited time and input in which to 
acquire logical concepts and inference rules: logic would be transcendentally 
unlearnable, not just contingently so. Whether a Logic Faculty is intrinsically tied 
to a Language Faculty remains an open question for future research. 
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